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VICARIOUS PUNISHMENT AND WAR CRIMES
PROSECUTION: THE CIVIL WAR OR ALICE
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
RICHARD ARENSt
INTRODUCTION
Faced with an international crisis of the first magnitude, the
United States is once again confronted with the problem of the
invocation of sanctions for violations of the rectitude norm of
American or world proportions. The problem may require in-
tensive scrutiny as an outgrowth of the urgent demands of policy
developments on a rapidly changing national and international
scene.
In five short years mere expectations of the use of violence
in international affairs have materialized into the very violence
itself. Within few months specters have changed into realities.
Aggressive war and violation of the rules of war have become
acute problems for statesmen and lawyers. Recent Korean de-
velopments, which may well be outdistanced by more serious
events by the time of this publication, have presented the policy-
makers of the world community with the problem of vindicating
rectitude norms not only through the cruder channels of organ-
ized violence but also through the legal processes available under
existing international law or through such as may yet become
available in the form of international criminal tribunals.'
Inevitably an operative theory of sanctions is a function of the
culture in which it is used at a given stage of its development.
A quest for the dominant theory therefore should not confine
itself to an examination of official doctrine but should probe
further for the leitmotiv. It is submitted that the leitmotiv of
American sanction theory, to the extent to which it has been
manifested in the present crisis, is not encompassed in a more
traditional pattern of modern philosophies of punishment em-
bracing deterrence,2 the "categorical imperative,13 individual re-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo.
1. A consideration of international criminal tribunals from American
constitutional perspectives is available in McDougal and Arens, The
Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950).
2. For a recognition of deterrence as a policy motivation in rational form
see State ex Tel. Kelly v. Wolfer, 119 Minn. 368, 138 N.W. 315 (1912).
3. See KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Edinburgh) 195: "The Penal
Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the
serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may
discharge him from the Justice of Punishment ......
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habilitation, 4 or even the more drastic model of "measures of
social defence" for "socially dangerous acts" propounded by
Enrico Ferri. 5 This leitmotiv, instead, is deemed to be embodied
in what is a unique American contribution to the field of sanction
theory. It has been variously described as the use of sanctions
to maximize a transformation of the social scene, i.e. as an
instrument of social change, or alternately, as a thera-
peutic agent for the "non-criminal" masses, intended, for exam-
ple, for the purpose of reducing the existing tension levels,7 or
as a "socially controlled catharsis."8 Existing designations of
this phase leave several vital elements out of account. It is these
elements which constitute a point of inquiry in this study.
The elements left out are these: the object or target of the
punishment may not be so much the delinquent culprit as the
vast "law-abiding" group which requires constant reinforcement
of its super-ego by the sight of the infliction of punishment or
the retribution upon villainy. Modern psychoanalytical knowl-
edge has furnished essential insights into this problem upon
a social planef It may help to specifically explain a claim
for punishment in terms of latent or pronounced criminal
tendencies on the part of the claimant.10 The "vindication
4. See State ex rel. Kelly v. Wolfer, note 2 supra: "No longer is propor-
tionate punishment to be meted out to the criminal measure for measure;
but the unfortunate offender is to be committed to the charge of the officers
of the state, as a sort of penitential ward, to be restrained so far as neces-
sary to protect the public from recurrent manifestations of his criminal
tendencies . .. but if possible, to be reformed, cured of his criminality, and
finally released, a normal man, and a rehabilitated citizen."
5. See FERRi, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTo CRiMINALE (1928). For a general
summary of modern sanction theory see SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CIM-
INOLOGY 328-352 (1939).
6. See Polier, Law, Conscience and Society, 6 LAW. GUILD R8v. 490
(1946). See also DESSION, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC
ORDER 197 (1948).
7. For a good study of the subject of tension levels see WILL s, THE
REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP TENSIONS (1947).
8. See GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS, THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
174 (1944).
9. See ALEXANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUB-
LIC (1931).
10. The recognition has gained ground that the demand for the punish-
ment of others may be occasioned by the presence of the severest guilt feel-
ings within oneself. The use of "projection" of such guilt feelings is known
as a common device. The insistence upon the punishment of others for pur-
poses of achieving vicarious expiation may thus become an inevitable con-
sequence. See generally, ALEXANDER AND STAUB, op. cit. supra note 9;
ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 114-115 (1948); ALEX-
ANDER, OUR AGE OF UNREASON (1942); HORNEY, THE NEUROTIC PERSON-
ALITY OF OUR TIME (1937) ; and particularly the character study of individ-
ual judges in LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948).
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of justice" by the most rigid enforcement of rectitude norms
by. punishment of individual malefactors, may in such a
context, be tantamount to an individual catharsis on the
part of the chief advocate for punishment. The latter ex-
periences a form of vicarious expiation and moral atonement
for his personal guilt or his guilt feelings. The spectacle
which is presented therefore is that of the person or group whose
insistence upon the punishment of others is founded upon the
compulsive need of the punishment of oneself: one's own identi-
fication with the criminal traits of the unutterable foe is so close
that one achieves a purging of the guilt incurred by one's own
instinctual and non-instinctual drives by the severest punishment
of the foe who manifests those traits in one form or in another.
Thus, one of the factors making for an upsurge of the popular
call for Nemesis to all who have sinned is the presence of the
feeling of severest guilt in those who are most vocal in the
issuance of such a call.
To the extent to which this tendency is manifest, the intensity
of the call for punishment is proportioned to the degree of crim-
inal tendencies which govern those who are behind the call. What
has been called "social catharsis" or the "reduction of tension
levels" comprises at least in part the projection of guilt and the
urge for vicarious atonement.
Symptomatic of the situation described is the high degree of
moral indignation of the sanction-invoking response.
It is interesting to note that the degree of the moral indigna-
tion of the sanction-invoking response in the treatment of Nazi
war criminals on the part of the American public was infinitely
lower than that manifested in the call for the punishment by
the supreme sanction of war or by other means of Russians
and their satellites.1 This may well explain in part the abysmal
failure of the program of war crimes prosecution in post-war
Germany and the disintegration of the last vestiges of a de-nazi-
11. Note the quiet dignity of Justice Jackson's opening address before the
Nuremberg tribunal for the prosecution (2 Trial of the Major War Crim-
inals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1947, 98 et
seq.) in constrast to the neurotic extreme of present attitudes. (See New
York Times, Sept. 26 (1950) p. 1: "U.S. Consults Others On Peace Terms.
Soviet Is Excluded, Washington Wants UN to Set Course Beyond the 38th
Parallel." Or New York Times, December 9 (1950) p. 1ff "President
Truman threatened to beat up a critic who had criticized the singing of his
daughter Margaret ....." For an anthropological study of American char-
acter see GonER, THE AMEriiCAN PEOPLES (1948).
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fication program.12 The hypothesis is here advanced that one of
the reasons for this difference in response is the fact of lesser
similarity in attitude between American and Nazi-German, and
a greater similarity and, concomitantly therewith, a greater de-
gree of a shared guilt, between American and Soviet Russian,
attitudes.13 One need only to point to the ever increasing com-
mon aspects of Soviet and American behavior in the leveling of
human dignity by the impersonal machinations of a monolithic
state machinery and the skillful use of science as distinct from
pseudo-science as the handmaiden of the garrison prison state,
to recognize a common source of guilt and the inherent potenti-
alities of a common drive for vicarious punishment and expi-
ation.'4
Northern United States or "Union" experience in the mani-
festation of such a phenomenon in the course of the Civil War
12. The epitome of the failure of American attempts at denazification
is perhaps signified by the American parole of Ilse Koch, a woman charged
with the manufacture of lamp-shades out of human skin and her subsequent
retrial by German authorities. See New York Herald Tribune, December 11
(1950) p. 1.
13. A thoroughly personal note of vindictive paranoid aggression char-
acterized the Nazi response to the environment. See FRO1IIm, EsCAPE FROM
FREEDOM 207-239 (1941). A thoroughly impersonal brutalization has char-
acterized both Soviet and American aggressive tendencies. See AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR, SLAVE LABOR IN RussiA (1949); PETROV, SOVIET GOLD
(1949) for the Soviet scene. For American predispositions see note 14 infra.
14. No opposition worthy of the name is voiced to a "bipartisan" Amer-
ican foreign policy. "Heretics" are hounded out of public employment in
short order. For a documented account see MCWILLIAMS, WITCH HUNT
(1950). It is significant moreover, that the fact of complete or partial
physical extermination of political opponents should even be considered as
one of a series of possibilities by serious scientific thinkers in this country
under the impact of new turns of policy. See Lasswell, The Interrelations
of World Organization and Society, 55 YAiL L. J. 889, 900 (1946): "Perhaps
the leaders of 'Imperial America' would be able to protect themselves from
assassins and revolutionists by ruthlessly applying modern scientific and
technical methods.... The loyalty of every individual could be put under
the unremitting surveillance of military and police intelligence. Everyone
could be required to undergo a regular medical and psychological examina-
tion (quarterly or annually) which would include tests to determine the
presence or absence of 'dangerous thoughts.' (Each person could be put
under the influence of drugs and questioned). Besides the application of
scientific methods to enforce disclosure, other possibilities, long ago fore-
seen, may be adopted. Quite likely there are ways of incapacitating actual
or suspected opponents, without depriving them of some usefulness in pro-
duction. The technical problem would be to destroy the higher cortical
centers, while retaining enough coordination to allow for the performance
of repetitive operations. In this way permanent caste difference (permanent
disparities in level of culture) could be established inside the garrison-
prison state." In contrast to such purposeful scientific practices, the Nazis
frittered time and energy away on experimentation with pseudo-eugenics.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/7
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provide useful laboratory material in a study of the intensity
of the drive for punishment as a function of individual and
national guilt.
A page of history may thus be worth an infinity of volumes
of logic. The following is adduced as one item, transcending
mere historical interest, in the construction of the chain of evi-
dence to prove this point.
In any event, it may be useful to review evidence of earlier
American experience as a guide to present action.
It is noteworthy that the psychological climate of Northern
theories of war crimes punishment was itself heavily suffused
with a deep-seated feeling of guilt as a result of Northern par-
ticipation in the continued violation of the verbally accepted
Christian ethics by the tolerance of slavery, and of constitutional
principle by the acceptance of revolutionary, as distinct from
constitutional, change. In this connection Lincoln and Taney
alike present ideal studies in ambivalence.1
It appears almost as though the very fact that revolutionary
change had ever been held out as a civilized alternative now
demanded the most drastic repudiation in the form of punish-
ment which was to be inflicted upon the rebels by the very people
who had once openly flirted with it at least in the field of the-
oretical espousal. Such repudiation, charged with the highest
form of emotional voltage, became, in fact an inexorable path
toward self respect.
It was hardly surprising, therefore, that to the zealot thunder-
ing for the punishment of the confederate violators of the rules
15. Lincoln in his first inaugural repeated the specific assurance: "I have
no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slav-
ery. . ." He went on to declaim the familiar lines: "This country, with
its institutions belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall
grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitu-
tional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or
overthrow it." In his second inaugural he found occasion to exclaim dolor-
ously: "'Woe unto the world because of offensesl for it must needs be that
offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.' If we
shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which having continued through
his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North
and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense
came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes
which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him?"
Taney, to take the other example, defended a man in a prosecution for
inciting slaves to servile insurrection (see Trial of the Rev. Jacob Gruber,
note 52 infra) and found time to write the Dred Scott decision in his later
years. (See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 [1857]).
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of war, the supreme guilt was encompassed by secession and
"disloyalty." All other crimes were deemed to follow from the
first. In this view the most blood-curdling atrocity paled in
heinousness when compared to the "rebellion" itself.
If rebellion be treason, then, indeed "there is no crime which
can more excite and agitate the passions of men."' 6 And rebel-
lion had invariably been regarded as treason in the past.17 Little
wonder then that great fall was felt to debase the opponent, to
the point where he could be called in Shakespeare's language,
if need be:
Worthy to be a rebel, for to that
The multiplying villainies of nature
Do swarm upon him.
Every violation of the rules of war could thus be regarded as
the mere "work of treason, the legitimate result of that sum of
all villainies."' And its perpetrators could be dubbed "outlaws
and criminals" who had shocked "the moral sentiment of the
universe." 9
VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF WAR IN COMBAT
'You will observe the rules of battle of course?' the White
Knight remarked, putting on his helmet too. 'I always do,'
said the Red Knight, and they began banging away at each
other with such fury that Alice got behind a tree to be out
of the way of the blows. Lewis Carroll, Through the Look-
ing Glass.
"Union" views of Confederate violations of the rules of war,
from the inception of the Civil War, however distorted and
affected by the heat of conflict, are vital for an understanding of
the developing theory of war crimes punishment. Sanction
theory within "Union" lines in its classic phase was predicated
upon the assumption of the existence of a generic conspiracy
between the Confederate government and military leadership
and the further assumption that every violation of the rules of
16. Chief Justice Marshall in Ex Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 125.
17. Id. at 126: "If war be actually levied ... all those who perform any
part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of the action, and
who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as
traitors."
18. See the Judge Advocate's closing argument in the TRIAL OF CAPTAIN
HENRY WIz, 8 AMERICAN STATE TRALS 657, 785 (1865).
19. Ibid.
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war was in pursuance of a common criminal design.2 0 Every
violation, therefore, took on added meaning. Northern war
crimes allegations are most readily divisible into the following
categories:
1. Technical violations of the rules of war.
2. Atrocities.
3. General terror tactics and a "total" war.
Of the first, the number of offences committed by any army
in any armed clash is legion. The violations generally fall into
the field which is the twilight zone between the so-called allow-
able surprises, deceptions and stratagems, on the one hand, and
the proscribed military treachery and perfidy on the other.
2 1
An outstanding example of such a charge is one of the allega-
tions contained in the report of a joint Congressional committee
on the conduct of the war:
The operations of the enemy ... were characterized by
the same bad faith and treachery that seems to have become
the settled policy of Forrest and his command. The flag of
truce was taken advantage of there as elsewhere, to secure
desirable positions which the rebels were unable to obtain
by fair and honorable means.22
Or again:
The rebels having thus far failed in their attack now
resorted to their customary use of flags of truce... During
the time these flags of truce were flying, the rebels were
moving down the ravine and taking positions from which
the more readily to charge upon the fort.
23
Except insofar as violations of this type furnished additional
support for the theory of a common conspiracy of which these
acts were deemed surface manifestations, they presented no par-
ticular problem in the realm of immediate punishment. Without
much difficulty they were all amenable to sanctions invoked
under the generally accepted articles of war under field con-
ditions.
Of the second category, the offences, at least until the advent
of the second World War have been infinitely smaller. The an-
20. See the Congressional debates on the punishment of Jefferson Davis,
infi'a.
21. HALLECK, LAWS OF WAR, 158-184 (1875).
22. See Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, reproduced
in WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE CRUELTIES AND ATROCITIES OF THE REBELLION,
66 (1865). MOORE, RESELL. REC. (Doc.) Rebel Barbarities (U.S. Congress.
Joint Committee on the conduct of the war).
23. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 3.
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nals of the Civil War, however, are replete with charges of their
constant commission.
Beginning with the Battle of Bull Run, the list of charges
grows in geometrical progression with the passage of the war
years. In brief, the first charges were that "barbarities of a
hideous nature were perpetrated by the rebels upon the "Union"
soldiers who fell into their hands at the battle of Bull Run, that
prisoners of war were shot and bayoneted; that the wounded and
dying were treated with neglect and inhumanity; that the dead
were outraged, and the very grave was desecrated and despoiled,
in a manner supposed to be characteristic only of savages.
24
And the eye-witnesses to these alleged outrages ranged from
privates in the "Union" army to Senator Sprague of Rhode Is-
land and General James B. Ricketts.25
Investigating the alleged massacre of the "Union" garrison of
Fort Pillow, the joint Congressional Committee received testi-
mony by eye-witnesses which bids fair to equal that of some of
the worst battle-field outrages of much later years. Seemingly
in concert with a policy set from above, Confederate troops,
according to these reports, after inviting the surrender of the
"Union" garrison, refused all quarter to surrendering troops and
engaged in deliberate extermination of survivors with particular
vehemence and brutality against Negroes. In the words of one
of the survivors:
When the Confederates rushed into the fort . . . the
Federals threw down their arms in token of surrender and
many exclaimed: 'We surrender.' Immediately an indis-
criminate massacre commenced on both black and white
soldiers . . . I saw the Confederates shoot and kill and
wound both white and black federal prisoners ...I saw
officers as well as privates kill and wound prisoners, and
heard them say, while held a prisoner with them in the
24. WILSON, op. cit. supra note 22, at 14, embodying excerpts from Con-
gressional hearings.
25. Id. at 15-26. See the testimony of General Ricketts: "There were a
number of our men shot. On one occasion there were two shot, one was
killed and the other wounded .... I have heard of a great many of our
prisoners who had been bayoneted and shot. I saw three of them, two of
them had been beyoneted, and one of them had been shot.... ." Cf. testi-
mony of Senator Sprague: "While we were digging there, some negro
women came up and asked whom we were looking for; and at the same
time said that 'Colonel Slogan' had been dug up by the rebels-some men
of a Georgia regiment-his head cut off, and his body taken to a ravine
some thirty or forty yards below, and there burned."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/7
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country, that they intended taking the prisoners still further
into the country, and make an example of them... I heard
officers say they would never recognize negroes as prisoners
of war, but would kill them whenever taken... Officers of
negro troops were treated and murdered the same as
negroes themselves . . . On my return to the Fort, I saw
and recognized the remains of Lieutenant Akerstrom; he
had been nailed to a house, and supposed burned alive.
There were the remains of two negroes lying where the
house burned. I was told they were nailed to the floor. I
also found a negro partially buried, with his head out of
the ground, alive ... I can recount but a small part of the
barbarities I saw on that fatal day... 26
As the war progressed reports of atrocities by the Confeder-
ate troops multiplied. The picture drawn by survivors took on
a sickeningly familiar pattern:
The rebel soldiers came out of the fort and bayoneted all
the colored soldiers who were so badly wounded that they
could not walk.2 7
Ingenuity was added to brutality according to further reports.
Thus in February 1862, "Union" Major General Curtis, stated
flatly that "Union" officers and men had been poisoned by eating
provisions at Mud Town in Arkansas which the retreating Con-
federate forces had specifically left behind to achieve such ends.28
Systematic "Union" plans for war crimes punishment first be-
gan to assume shape under the impact of such reports. It is im-
possible to obtain objective verification of these reports at this
stage but it is possible to state that their deliberately widespread
dissemination was specifically intended to lay the groundwork for
public acceptance of a major step toward the intensification of
punishment. General orders were issued requiring that persons
"guilty of such acts" should, when captured, not be treated as
ordinary prisoners of war "but should suffer the ignominious
punishment of being hung as felons.129 While no evidence exists
that this included overt orders to dispense with ordinary or mili-
tary trial procedure in the disposition of alleged offenders, one
26. M o00R, op. cit. supra note 22, at 68, 69.
27. Report of the Commanding officer of the Thirty-sixth U.S. Colored
Troops to Army Headquarters on October 12, 1864, reproduced in WILSON,
op. it. supra note 22, at 286.
28. See the statement by the Union's International Law expert Major
General Halleck, reproduced posthumously in 6 Am. J. INT. L. 109 (1912).
29. Ibid: Quotation from order of Major General Curtis.
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would be naive indeed in thinking the military mind capable
of executing such orders in any but the most direct military way.
Looming large in importance is the third category of war
crimes charges concerning general terror tactics and a "total"
war. It should be recalled that at this stage of history, the total-
ity of the war effort was severely circumscribed at least in
theory, by the then prevailing rules of international law. For
example, bacteriological warfare such as use of poisoned weapons
and the poisoning of wells and food supplies was regarded with
universal revulsion and was proscribed.30 Protection of the
"inoffensive" non-combatant citizen of hostile territory was the
rule and had been officially incorporated as such in the Instruc-
tions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in
the field, known as Lieber's Code.31 Partisan and guerrilla troops
were regarded as outlaws.3 2 The principle of retaliation was
viewed with some suspicion and distrust.3 3 A generally chivalric
code prescribed the equal and adequate treatment of the captured
enemy.3 4 It was against this background that the charges of
terror tactics by Confederate forces were first aired.
The Confederacy was accused of the employment of new and
diabolical weapons. It was charged that Confederate disregard
for orthodox weapons of warfare was responsible for the intro-
duction of "torpedoes... (which were planted) in the paths
of our soldiers,' 35 a device which subsequently became known
as the use of land mines. It was claimed that poisons had been
employed against "Union" troops 36 and that a bacteriological
attack had been planned against the federal capital.3 It was said
that "inoffensive" non-combatants became the targets of Con-
federate attack, that, e.g., whole towns were indiscriminately
burned,3 8 and civilians serving on hospital ships were mis-
treated. 9 Confederate authorities were credited with the support
30. See HALLECK, LAWS OF WAR, 179 (1874).
31. General Orders No. 100 (1863) reproduced in 7 MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 172, 173.
32. HALLECK, LAWS OF WAR, 175 (1874).
33. See the general works of VATTEL.
34. HALLECK, op. cit. supra note 32, at 197.
35. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, supra note 18.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. See WILSON, op. cit. supra note 22, "Burning of Chambersburg, Pa."
242.
39. HOWARD, TEI BARBARITIES OF THE REBELS, 29 (1863) quoting the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/7
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and encouragement of guerrilla forces who were alleged to be
responsible for pillage and murder.40
It is immaterial from the standpoint of the sanction specialist
whether these reports were substantiated or not. It is highly
material that these reports were widely believed and that they
engendered a high degree of moral indignation. It is doubly
material that this moral indignation entailed a widening target
area for the contemplated infliction of sanctions.
The specter of retribution was invoked against both perpe-
trators and accomplices. A new theory was hastily developed
to cope with the largest group of possible defendants. For the
first time in American history and for the only time until the
Yamashita trial,41 it was authoritatively declared that "all offi-
cers are in a measure responsible for the acts of the troops under
their command," 42 that an officer is in fact prima facie guilty
of the crimes committed by his subordinates, and that it inex-
orably "rests upon him to prove his innocence. 4 3
It is clear that the underlying rationale of these measures was
retaliation as a tool of deterrence. Hallowed or infamous pre-
cedent had been made available for this early in the war in the
handling of alleged pirates or privateers.4 4 The enemy had pro-
New York Illustrated News, Feb. 7 (1863): "These unarmed and defense-
less men were stripped of their clothing, tied to trees, and cowhided."
40. See WILSON, op. cit. supra note 22, at 138, 139 reproducing report of
Commanding officer of the Fifth Cavalry of the Missouri State Militia on
the alleged outrages of Missouri guerrilas. Cf. HALLEOK, op. cit. supra
note 32, at 174: "Some of the worst kinds of guerrilla bands have been
authorized and organized by their own governments, as in Spain, Mexico,
and the Rebel States of America."
41. Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
42. See Major General Curtis' statement, supra note 29.
43. See the statement of HZAECK, supra note 28.
44. The first crime to be inextricably linked to the "sum of all villainies"
was piracy. Indeed if not linked to treason at all it will be seen to have been
no crime to begin with.
Smarting under the stranglehold of the federal blockade, the Confederate
government resorted to the use of privateers to make up, however scantily,
for its naval inferiority. A flotilla of privateers, operating under letters of
marque issued by the Confederate government ravaged Union coastal waters
and as described by Jefferson Davis, "filled the enemy with consternation."
(JEFFERSON DAvIs, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF
A ME CA, 128 (1890).) The consternation was speedily reversed when the
tables were turned by the capture of Confederate privateers by federal
vessels and the threat of federal prosecution of the captives for the crime
of piracy was invoked. Piracy has been traditionally defined as "robbery,
or forcible depredation upon the sea, animo furandi," (United States v.
Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 161), with the vital proviso, however, that it be per-
petrated without the authority of a state behind it. (The Ambrose Light,
25 Fed. 408 (185). Cf. PHILLIMORE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw 488 (3d ed.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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vided several excuses for a competition in barbarity. One such
excuse was in the form of official Southern acts of outlawry or
attainder against specific Northern commanders. Explicit stan-
dards of collective guilt, moreover, were evolved by the North
in the handling of the problem posed by the guerrillas. "Union"
officers became convinced that ten of them, "armed as they are,
with their wives and children to act as spies... (were) equal
to twenty-five... (Union soldiers) .-4" Accordingly they arrested
1879).) An attempted prosecution against this background raises several
questions. Was the Declaration of Paris of 1856 (See KUNZ, KRIEGSRECHT
UND NEIuTRALITATSRECHT, 112 (1935).) which barred the use of privateers
and removed any obstacles in the way of their punishment as pirates binding
in the instant situation in the light of the United States' failure to adhere
to it? Could Confederate privateers, therefore, be regarded as acting with-
out some legitimate state authority? Did the confederacy represent a bellig-
erent or a state or both? The answers to the first two questions are at best
uncertain from the standpoint of the "Union" protagonist. The answer to
the last is clearly an affrmative. Doubtless the position of the Confederates
was one of claiming "to be in arms to establish their liberty and indepen-
dence, in order to become a sovereign state, while the sovereign party ...(treated) them as insurgents and rebels who ... (owed) allegiance and who
should be punished with death for their treason." (The Prize Cases, 2 Black
635 (1862).) None the less, the "sovereign party" was engaged in more
than a mere police operation. The world "acknowledges . .. (both parties
to a civil war) as belligerents .. ." (Ibid.) and both parties in turn "adopt
the . . . courtesies and rules common to public or national wars." (Ibid.)
In other words the status of a state in such a situation is mutually recog-
nized. The status of Confederate belligerency had been implicitly recognized
by the federal government in its proclamation of the blockade. The British
Government did not hesitate to point to it as ample justification for its recog-
nition of the Confederate status as belligerents in its proclamation of neu-
trality on May 13, 1861, and for its denial of a subsequent United States
claim for indemnity. (BRIcS THE LAW OF THE NATIONS 729 (1944.) It
is interesting to note that it has since become the official United States posi-
tion that "a blockade can be enforced against ships flying foreign flags only
through the exercise of belligerent rights.... By asserting belligerent rights
on the high seas, the North thereby recognized the belligerency of the Con-
federates." (See P. C. Jessup, "The Spanish Rebellion and International
Law," 15 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 260, 273 (1937). Cf. U.S. Department of State
Press Release, No. 361, August 29, 1936, p. 192.) The conclusion is inescap-
able that the basis of a piracy prosecution would have been highly tenuous
indeed. Yet at least one such prosecution was launched and carried to a
conviction. (See Full Report of the Trial of William Smith for Piracy,
Philadelphia (1861).) No record of any further prosecution exists. Jeffer-
son Davis had threatened in an earlier case of an attempted prosecution for
piracy that "painful as will be the necessity" complete retaliation would be
ordered. (JEFFERSON DAVIS, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES
OF AMERICA 120 (1870).) He now "instructed General Winder, at Richmond
to select one federal prisoner of the highest rank, to be confined in a cell
appropriate to convicted felons, and treated in all respects as if convicted,
and to be held for execution in the same manner as might be adopted for
the execution of the prisoner of war," (Ibid.) awaiting execution by the
federal authorities. The execution for piracy was not carried out. A prece-
dent was set for a new pattern of retaliatory action that was to form an
integral part of war crimes prosecution theory in the future.
45. WILSON, op. cit. supra, note 22, at 139.
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"the wives and sisters of some of the most notorious ones, to
prevent them from carrying their threats into execution. 4
In 1862, Jefferson Davis announced that for the crime
of using slaves in armed service against the Confederacy,
"Union" Generals Phelps and Hunter were to be treated as out-
laws and were to be executed by hanging upon their apprehen-
sion.47 In the same year, for the "crime" of confirming the death
penalty imposed after trial by a military commission upon a citi-
zen of Louisiana for tearing down a "Union" flag, "Union"
General Butler, by proclamation of Jefferson Davis, was declared
a felon, deserving of capital punishment,... an outlaw and com-
mon enemy of mankind.148 Confederate forces were ordered
that "in the event of his capture, the officer in command of the
capturing force do cause him to be immediately executed by
hanging."' 9 Infinitely more significant were the following pro-
visions of the proclamation:
That all commissioned officers in the command of said
Benjamin F. Butler be declared not entitled to be considered
as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers
and criminals deserving death, and that they and each of
them, whenever captured, be reserved for execution.
That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered
over to the executive authorities of the respective states, to
be dealt with according to the laws of said states.
That the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to
all commissioned officers of the United States when found
serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against
the authorities of the different states of this Confederacy.60
To the negro apprehended in an act of servile insurrection,
being dealt with according to the laws of the Southern states
meant death.51 To the white officer commanding Negro troops
46. Ibid.
47. MOORE, REBELL REc. (Diary) v. 62.
48. Proclamation by Jefferson Davis, reproduced in WILSON, Op. Cit.
supra note 22, at 282, 283.
49. Ibid. Cf. JEFFERSON DAVIS, &p. cit. supra note 44, at 445: "I therefore
pronounced and declared that said Butler a felon, deserving capital punish-
ment, and ordered that he be no longer considered as a public enemy of the
Confederate states, but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind, and
that in the event of his capture, the officer in command should cause him
to be immediately executed by hanging."
50. See note 48 supra at 283.
51. See 5 S.C. STATUTES AT LARa 503.
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conviction for incitement to servile insurrection could mean a
long term of imprisonment 52 or death itself.53
The competition in barbarism did not find the federal govern-
ment lagging far behind. Rationalization for the forthcoming
retaliatory action was couched in terms of deterrence and na-
tional protection. Thus retaliation was labelled not as "a mea-
sure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribu-
tion, and, moreover, cautiously and unavoidably." 54 An order of
"counter-retaliation" was issued by President Lincoln on July 30,
1863. For every "Union" soldier killed in violation of the laws of
war "a rebel soldier... (was to) be executed and for every one
enslaved, a rebel soldier... (was to) be placed at hard labor...
and (so) continued.., until the other... (should) receive the
treatment due a prisoner of war."5 5 When in retaliation for the
execution of two Confederate officers for espionage, the Con-
federate forces picked by lot two "Union" prisoners for summary
execution, President Lincoln ordered the immediate seizure of
General Lee's son and another Confederate prisoner and their
execution by hanging the moment authentic information was
received of the execution of the "Union" officers.5 6
Yet while retaliation or counter-retaliation became the ac-
cepted federal policy in this field, the matter of war crimes
punishment was very much a matter of improvisation and ex-
perimentation. It was only in the field of the general treatment
of prisoners that a concrete theory of war crimes punishment
began to take shape. Once again, however, it must be borne in
mind that emerging theories were the mere rationalizations to
basic emotional drives among which was the drive for vicarious
atonement and that rational articulation of the theory had little
relationship to reality.
52. For a pre-Civil War example of a prosecution for servile insurrection
see The Trial of the Rev. Jacob Gruber, 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 69
(1819).
53. The Confederate Congress provided that white officers in charge of
colored troops be presumed to be "inciting servile insurrection" and should
if captured be sentenced to death or otherwise punished at the discretion
of a court. JOURNAL, CONFED. CONG., III, 386, 387.
54. LIEBER'S CODE; see note 31 supra.
55. Quotation from RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR & RECONSTRUCTION, 506
(1937).
56. See MORAN, BASTILES OF THE CONFEDERACY, 1-17 (1890).
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VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF WAR OUTSIDE OF COMBAT
Charges of Confederate violations of the rules of war outside
of combat are in turn divisible into two major categories:
1. Racial discrimination against federal prisoners in matters
of prisoner exchange and "cartels."
2. Indiscriminate infliction of "inhuman" conditions upon
federal prisoners either by culpable neglect or by design or both.
The first charge was readily substantiated and more readily
admitted. Reports had circulated from the first days of the
Civil War that captured Negro troops were segregated by Con-
federate forces and refused the right of exchange under existing
agreements with the federal government. Thus, e.g., the New
York Tribune reported early during the war that:
One hundred and eight of our wounded are still at
Charleston and Columbia. The officers and men of the 54th
Massachusetts (colored) will not be given up, nor has it
yet been positively ascertained what has become of them.
Unofficial reports say the negroes have been sold into slav-
ery, and that the officers are treated with unmeasured
abuses. 57
A senate resolution proceeded to allege that the Confederate
authorities "hold in barbarous captivity many officers and sol-
diers of the United States, and refuse to exchange them except
upon condition that they be allowed to retain such of our soldiers
as they call Negroes, and such of our officers as have commanded
Negro troops.""'
Jefferson Davis himself blithely admitted at least a part of
the allegations. The Confederate government, he explained, did
not discriminate against Negroes qua Negroes but against Ne-
groes qua slaves and the property of Southern slaveholders. As
summed up by the Confederate President:
The government of the United States contended that the
slaves in their ranks were such no longer; that it was bound
to accord to them, when made prisoners the same protection
that it gave all other soldiers. We asserted the slaves to be
property, under the Constitution of the United States and
that of the Confederate States, and that property recap-
tured from the enemy in war reverts to its owner, if he can
be found, or it may be disposed of by its captor.59
57. Reproduction of news dispatch in HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 39.
58. 44 CONG. GLOBE 118 (1864). Cf. HIGGINSON, ARMY Lu IN A BLACK
REGIAIENT (1868).
59. 2 JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE Gov-
ERNIENT, 507.
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In line with the developing notions of the justice of protective
as distinct from vindictive retaliation, the federal command
ordered the cessation of all prisoner exchanges until such time
as the Confederate government should cease discrimination
against colored "Union" prisoners.60
Specifications of charges in the second category were more
numerous. Confederate action was believed to be motivated by
"a determination... to subject those of our soldiers who were so
unfortunate as to fall into their hands to a system of treatment
which has resulted in reducing many of those who have survived
and been permitted to return to us to a condition, both physically
and mentally, which no language can adequately describe."' '
Specifically, the surviving prisoners returning from Confederate
captivity, were said to present, in Buchenwald fashion, "literally
the appearance of living skeletons. 8 1 2 Moreover, the crimes of
starvation and neglect were said to have been the companions of
brutality. Shooting and torture were claimed to be integral
parts of Confederate prison camp routine.63 In reply to these
charges Confederate protagonists countercharged with similar
allegations, denied the stopping of rations or explained it as
brought on by necessity of scarcity.- They denied the general
charge of cruelty but admitted the use of such terror devices
as an arbitrary "deadline" in Fort Andersonville, for example,
beyond which straying prisoners could be used for target prac-
tice by the sentries. 5
The call for retaliation was again raised in response to the
reports of Confederate cruelty. It was couched in terms of a
modern and more enlightened theory of lex talionis in its stress
upon the protection inherent in such action for federal soldiers.
It provided a safety valve for the moral indignation of rising
tensions. But it included a more sinister note in the bargain.
Apprehensive of the poor physical condition of returning fed-
60. OFFic. REC., 2 Ser., VII, 62, 63.
61. See MOORE, REBEL. REC. (Doc.) Rebel Barbarities (U.S. Congress,
Joint Committee on the conduct of the War) 81.
62. Ibid.
63. See MORAN, op. cit. supra Note 56. Cf. Trial of Major Henry Wirz,
note 18 supra and MooRE, REBELL. REC., note 61 supra.
64. See the Confederate apologetics, in JEFFERSON DAvIS, op. cit. supra
note 59, at 513.
65. See further Confederate apologetics in BRAUN, ANDERSONVILLE(1892). For a balanced contemporary appraisal of charges and counter-
charges, see HESSELTINE, CIVIL WAR PRISONS (1930).
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eral prisoners who were frequently unfit for further combat,
federal protagonists of retaliatory action were consciously striv-
ing to even the score by rendering a proportionate number of
Confederate prisoners hors de combat.
The major available source for sanction theory is in the pages
of the congressional record. The emerging mood is frequently
one of clear-cut and pronounced hysteria.
Thus Senator Lane, speaking in support of a Senate resolution
recommending retaliation, declared:
Now, sir, if this is to be a war of extermination let not
the extermination be all upon one side. Mercy to felons and
traitors is cruelty to our own soldiers in southern prisons
They now indulge in a system of warfare the most
barbarous and atrocious known to the history of modern
civilization, and they can do no worse if we resolve, in jus-
tice to our own soldiers to mete out to those we have cap-
tured from the rebel army their own measure; at least
until they shall reform their conduct in reference to our
men. Will any act of ours further exasperate those felons,
and traitors, and demons, in human shape? 6
An overtly vindictive as distinct from a protective mood be-
came apparent with the introduction of a resolution for retali-
ation which took cognizance of a petition by citizens of Indiana
praying for the passage of a law "to place all rebel prisoners
now in our hands under the control of those officers and men who
have been in rebel hands." 67
While resistance to the acceptance of the principle of indis-
criminate prisoner retaliation was registered from time to time,""
this resistance was generally brushed aside. Since the con-
federacy was deemed engaged in the deliberate design of re-
ducing "Union" manpower by the starvation of prisoners, mili-
tary necessity was invoked to justify an identical procedure.
This was stated with remarkable candor by Congressman Wade:
Sir, I have no doubt.., that it is a deliberate purpose
of theirs to destroy every prisoner that comes into their
66. 45 CONG. GLOBE 268 (1865).
67. Id., 307.
68. See expression of views by Congressman Hendricks, id., 364: "I am
free to say I do not feel that the condition of my friends in the southern
prisons will be made any better, and they be made any happier, by seeing
some men in our prisons here in the north starved to death." Or again, id.
382 in the words of Senator Sumner: "I believe that the Senate will not
undertake in this. age of Christian light, under any inducement, under any
provocation, to counsel the Executive Government to enter into any such
competition with barbarism."
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hands. They do not intend that he shall be returned to us
in such a condition that he can ever again take the field.
Their inhuman treatment is probably owing more to this
consideration than mere feelings of malice. It is a system
of savage policy, and it has had a most powerful effect on
our army. Of the thousands of prisoners we have had in
their hands scarcely one of them is ever returned to us in
such a condition that he can take the field again; while on
the other side the prisoners that come into our possession
are treated precisely the same as our own soldiers are, and
they go back refreshed, recuperated, and ready to take the
field against us, every man of them. I have no doubt that
a prompt and stern resort to retaliation will have... bene-
ficial effect."'
On January 31, 1865, the Senate passed a resolution stipu-
lating that "the executive and military authorities of the United
States are hereby directed to retaliate upon the prisoners of the
enemy in such manner, in conformity with the laws and usages
of war among civilized nations, as shall be effective in deterring
him from the perpetration in future of cruel and barbarous
treatment of our soldiers." 70 The hope was expressed that Con-
federate atrocities would now cease.71 The stage was set for the
trial and punishment of both the authors and the perpetrators of
this "sum of ... villainies. ' 72
THE POST-WAR THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
"That justice should not fail of its purpose" war crimes trials
were insisted on with vigor and consistency. They were con-
ceived as fulfilling only secondarily the function of punishment
for the great conspiracy of the "rebellion" of which the war
crimes were but minor parts. The conspiracy theory therefore
became predominant. It is interesting to note that in the only
major war crimes prosecution in post-war days for atrocities
and prison brutalities, Jefferson Davis and other Confederate
leaders were, prior to the amendment of the indictment, 73 named
as co-conspirators whose alleged intent was "maliciously, will-
fully and traitorously.., to injure the health and destroy the
lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States...
69. Id. at 364.
70. Id. at 520, 522.
71. Id. at 522.
72. See note 18 supra.
73. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, 8 AMERICAN STATE TRIALs 657,
873.
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(confined) in the military prisons" of the Confederacy 7' The
case is known as The Trial of Henry Wirz. The enumeration of
the specific acts charged included a series of purely wanton cru-
elties toward prisoners, the stopping of rations, the establish-
ment of a "dead-line" beyond which prisoners not bent on escape
were shot at will, punishment by stocks and chain-gangs, the use
of blood-hounds for the recapture of fugitives 5 as well as direct
and unprovoked killing, coupled with general neglect and over-
crowding.
That one of the major motivations of the prosecution was to
link the whole Confederate government to the war crimes
became more apparent as the trial progressed. It began with the
introduction of evidence that the Confederate military superiors
of the defendant both condoned and encouraged the commission
of all those acts,76 and went on to implicate the Confederate
government by statements of alleged co-conspirators to the
effect that "President Davis had some knowledge of it."T
The defendant, who emerges in a thoroughly unsympathetic
light, even when portrayed by his friends,7 8 admitted intolerable
camp conditions, but disclaimed responsibility, denied the com-
mission of specific murders, and relied on the defense of superior
orders as his shield against the charges of a cruel and perverted
discipline. The prosecution demanded the rejection of the de-
fense of superior orders 9 and was sustained by the military
commission almost a century before the Nuremberg proceed-
ings.80
Since deterrence was no longer a vital factor after the con-
clusion of hostilities, no pretence was made to be actuated by
it in the prosecution. If a specific theory of punishment was
formulated at all it was analogous to the Kantian concept of
"absolute justice." But no specific theory was explicitly stated.
74. Id. at 671. See also Trial of Henry Wirz, Executive Documents No.
23, 40TH CONG., 2d SESS. THE DEMON OF ANDERSONVILLE OR THE TRIAL or
WiRz (1865).
75. An interesting case relied upon by prosecution and defense alike is
Moran v. Davis, 18 Ga. 722 (1855) where the trial court finding for the
plaintiff, held that an overseer had no right to chase slaves with such dogs
as might lacerate them, and the appellate court reversed.
76. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, note 73 supra, 792, 793.
77. Id. at 796.
78. See BRAUN, ANDERSONVILIE (1892).
79. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, note 73 supra at 871.
80. Proceedings of International War Crimes Tribunal, London (1945).
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Solely pronounced was the moral indignation of the sanction
invoking response. An inflammatory prosecution address dubbed
the defendant as not "entitled to the human name"'' and likened
him to a monster to whom "to shed human blood was . . . the
only important business and the only exhilarating pastime of
life."8 2 The reduction of popular tension levels by the sight of
villainy brought to bay and justice triumphant became an
avowed objective. It was given official approval by a verdict
of guilty and the confirmation of the sentence of death by Presi-
dent Johnson."3 It was not unnatural, therefore, that execution
of this minor member of the Confederate conspiracy should be
followed by a call for the punishment of the author of the "sum
of villainies," Davis himself.
Clamors for the speedy prosecution of the Confederate leader
were raised in Congress almost from the time of his capture
by "Union" forces. 84 The urgency of his punishment was under-
scored by the belief that over and above his acts of treason he
had "put to death by the slow torture of starvation in rebel
prisons sixty thousand brave men who went forth to peril their
lives in saving the country from his devilish crusade against it.
(that) he . . . (had) deliberately sought to introduce into the
United States and to nationalize among us pestilence, in the
form of yellow fever . . . (that) he . . . (had) instigated the
burning of our hotels . . . planted infernal machines in the
track of his armies . . , poisoned our wells ... (and) ... made
drinking cups of (enemy) skulls and jewelry of their bones."8 5
The descriptive extravagance, to use no stronger expression,
speaks for itself, as far as its factual reliability is concerned.
As far as its essential motivation is concerned it presents a
classic illustration of a projection of guilt coupled with the
projection of the demand for punishment, expressed in the more
traditional vengeance motif, recurring in the portrayal of the
Confederate leader as nothing more nor less than "an incarnate
demon . . . (who unleashed) the whole contagion of hell," '86 a
"human monster" who should be hanged "in the name of the
81. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, note 73 supra at 754.
82. Id. at 825.83. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, note 73 supra at 873, 874.
84. See Senate Resolution in 46 CONG. GLOBE 108 (1865).
85. Congressman Julian in 46 CONG. GLOBE 2283 (1866).
86. Id. at 2284.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/7
82 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
most high."8 7 His "transcendent and unutterable guilt"'8, was
deemed axiomatic and his execution demanded in a House reso-
lution clamoring for his speedy trial as an inexorable result-
"when," not "if" found guilty. 9 An "if" for the "when" was
not substituted for several weeks in an amendment.90
The call for condign punishment of the malefactor was more-
over grounded in three rationally articulated theories, at least
two of which were drawn from the traditional framework of
sanction theories.
. The theory of absolute justice expounded by Kant in terms
of the "categorical imperative" 91 was first. This is generally
formulated as an abstract demand for the assertion or reasser-
tion of principle and was so viewed by its proponents in Con-
gress. Punishment was thus demanded "in order that the con-
stitution and the laws may be fully vindicated, the truth clearly
established and affirmed that treason is a crime and that the
offense may be made infamous.1 92 While this theory contained
elements of deterrence, it was claimed to be strictly divorced
from the quasi-religious overtones of its sister-theory of atone-
ment or moral expiation for crime. 3 The government, it was
said, "has nothing to do with degrees of moral guilt or blame-
worthiness."- It was concerned largely with the prevention of
crime 95
The classical theory that punishment be nicely proportioned
to the act, discarded by some,90 was invoked by others. Beccaria,
quoted by proponents and opponents alike7 became authority
for the attempt at making the punishment fit the crime and the
resolution demanding that "just and adequate penalties be an-
nexed to the violation of law.198
By far the most fascinating theory of punishment was that
87. Ibid.
88. Id. at 2283.
89. Id. at 138.
90. Id. at 482.
91. See KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 195.
92. See 46 CONG. GLoBE 100.
93. Id. at 2283.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid: "(The Government) have nothing to do with that retributivejustice which graduates the punishment of each transgressor by the exact
measure of his guilt."
97. Id. at 2284.
98. Id. at 2724. Cf. BECCARM, CRIES AND PUNISHMENT (1809).
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which was based upon the assumption that criminal sanctions
should be used as instruments of social change and that the
severity or mildness of the sanction be made contingent upon
the social objectives and circumstances of the moment without
regard to either the personal "depravity" or "nobility" of the
offender. Thus punishment was demanded for the explicitly
utilitarian reason that, "without it, the rebellion itself, instead
of being effectually crushed, must find a fresh incentive to renew
its life in its impunity from the just consequences of its guilt."99
In this view, Jefferson Davis was not necessarily a personal
monster, but rather "a representative man of the rebellion."'01 0
And to crush the spirit of the rebellion it became necessary to
crush its "representative man." Only thus could "the majesty
of the law" be vindicated, "the confidence of loyal people" sus-
tained, and "the refractory" warned for all time to come.''
Linked to this theory was the further argument that the punish-
ment of Davis would fulfill the further function of securing
authoritative judicial settlement of the question whether any
state "of its own will has the right to renounce its place in the
Union." 0 2
It is wrong, however, to think of these theories as neatly
compartmentalized or mutually exclusive. The reverse is true.
Throughout the protracted congressional discussion on punish-
ment, all of these theories were hopelessly intermingled, some-
times even in a single speech. 103 It is the intermingling of the
theories in mutually contradictory ways which establishes be-
yond reasonable doubt their use as mere rationalizations for
basic drives of an irrational nature, including the drive for
vicarious punishment.
The final prosecution of Jefferson Davis, as approved by the
government, was one for treason with the avowed hope of se-
curing an adjudication that secession was a crime.1°4 It was
preceded by Congressional debate over venue requirements of
the case and the statement of the theory over the objection of
99. 46 CONG. GLOBE 2283.
100. Id. at 100.
101. Id. at 2724.
102. Id. at 100.
103. See Congressman Julian's discourse, Id. at 2282 et seq.
104. For a good account of the mechanics of the attempted prosecution
of Jefferson Davis see R. F. Nichols' "United States v. Jefferson Davis,"
31 AME ICAN HIsToicAL Rnviw 266.
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the Attorney General, s5 that in view of Davis' position of com-
mand and the universality of the effect of his actions, no venue
requirements were applicable and he could be deemed to have
been "constructively present" in any Northern state, for pur-
poses of trial.108
The political machinations surrounding the prosecution are
not within the scope of a study of sanction theory.
The trial of the Confederate leader was abandoned. Pleas of
nolle prosequi were entered for the government. The President
declared an unconditional pardon. 0' The first major American
experiment with war crimes punishment had come to an end.
CONCLUSION
A review of the completed experiment permits the drawing
of several conclusions.
Abundant evidence is available to justify the statement that
the disregard of democratic values and particularly the respect
for human dignity was consistently manifested by the military
cliques of both sides. Regardless of the underlying Northern
motivations, the "Union" engaged in a competition of barbaric
extremes with efficiency and gusto.
Abundant evidence, too, is available to justify the statement
that Congressional hysteria was not an impotent factor in this
field and that the dominance of the mob spirit in Congress be-
came patent.
Some evidence, at least, is available to justify the belief that
Northern action was explainable in terms of a projection of
guilt and the compulsive urge for vicarious atonement by the
punishment of Southern offenders.
One concludes regretfully that the lesson to be drawn from
this study is not likely to be taken to heart in the present situ-
ation. One may add, in all charity, that an age of mental and
emotional instability may present the policy makers of both
East and West with a possibility of the pleas of mental and
emotional defects and abnormalities which, however, are short
of the standard of complete exoneration, in extenuation of their
high offense before a higher judgment.
105. See 46 CONG. GLO.BE 567.
106. Ibid.
107. 15 U.S. STAT. AT LARGE 711.
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